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Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available document. The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means t? improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research; then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops.
L First Workshop: Policy Environment of Transparency
The first workshop addressed "the policy environment of transparency." Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: 1) a definition of transparency, 2) reasons for transparency,
3) detailed goals of transparency, and 4) obstacles to transparency.
A. Determine Different Definitions of Transparency
PNC felt that the definition of transparency could change depending upon the audience, the timing requirements of the activities, changes in the international environment, and therefore a broad definition 
B. Determine Reasons for Transparency
PNC organized its reasons for"transparency into three main areas: 1) the need for nuclear energy; 2) safety concerns; and 3) nonproliferation. LANL took a slightly different view and mentioned that it was desirable to give the public and other countries additional assurances that nonproliferation obligations are being met. LANL believes that extra steps beyond the requirements of IAEA promote a higher level of trust, although IAEA safeguards are completely adequate for verification of obligations under the NPT.
C. Determine the Detailed Goals of Transparency
For PNC, the goal of transparency is to become as transparent as possible to a variety of audiences;
however, 100% transparency to everyone is impossible. There are always inevitable, but reasonable and acceptable, obstacles to transparency, which will be mentioned in following section. Because of the differences in target audiences, the details of transparency measures will vary. Therefore, the ultimate goal of transparency is to show satisfactory level of transparency to each target audience as much as possible. This is the same approach suggested by LANL.
D. Determine the Obstacles to Transparency
For both sides, the complications of both domestic and international (multilateral and bilateral) agreements/laws are impediments to transparent y. Adhering to all the requirements of the myriad of agreements/laws is both time consuming and costly. Plus, it will also be difficult to create new transparent y initiatives without reviewing how they will interact with the existing agreements. However, obstacles, such as prohibition of disseminating certain information in physical protection of nuclear materials or sensitive nuclear technology (SNT), are understandable.
In the U.S. transparency measures must take into account national security concerns. The US has the added dimension of being a nuclear weapons state. Due to the classified nature of much of the information, man y additional steps are needed before the information can be released.
Both sides discussed the protection of proprietary rights and the. additional burdens of environmental, safety and health regulations. For both, a major concern is the cost of transparent y efforts.
Transparency activities can be expensive. The challenge is to increase transparency without adding to the escalating cost of these activities.
Il. Second Workshop: Development of Transparency Options
The topic of the second workshop was "Development of Transparency Options." The activities accomplished were 1) identifi type of facilities where transparency might be applied; 2) define criteria for applying transparency; and 3) delineate applicable transparency options.
A. Identify Type of Facilities Where Transparency Might Be Applied
Both PNC and LANL agree that on the basis of the potential availability of plutonium and HEU that is easily used for nuclear weapons, the facility types of greatest proliferation concern are enrichment, reprocessing, and MOX fuel fabrication facilities. Of somewhat less concern because of the high radiation fields are storage locations for spent fuel. This conclusion is similar to the IAEA emphasis on the protection of "direct use material," which is usable for nuclear weapons purpose without further isotopic enrichment or transmutation in a reactor.
B. Define Criteria for Applying Transparency
The next step is to create some basic criteria for the evaluation of different transparency options. PNC established five main criteria. But before evaluating those criteria, PNC would require that all information to be released undergo an initial review for quality, quantity and ownership. As for quality, information should be in a format that is easy to understand and be most beneficial to the target audience.
In order to avoid releasing too much similar information, the quantity of information already available should be reviewed. Also reviewing the ownership of the information is critical because there is a case that some information cannot be released without first consulting the owner due to existing agreements with third parties.
The goal of confidence building is to release information through transparency activities that will corroborate that there are no clandestine activities taking place, bolster the validity of material accountancy, confirm that nuclear materials are adequately protected and verify that non-proliferation obligations are being met. Detailed information concerning SNT and physical protection information
should not be released. The disruption category is primarily concerned with the set up and maintenance of a transparency activity. Every activity will be affected by several time constraints that will impact the effectiveness of the transparency activity. Cost is always a factor. Therefore a balance must be sought between the effectiveness of the tmnsparency activity, the time involved and its various costs. , LANL mentioned their important themes on criteria. First, transparency activities should be undertaken as part of a rational, coordinated plan to achieve clear objectives. Second, the idea that each transparency activity should have a clearly defined target audience(s). Third, the combination of the target audience and transparency goals will help determine and constrain acceptable transparent y options. And finally, each option must be reviewed in detail on a case-by-case basis to assure that the transparency objectives are being achieved. Based on these themes, LANL established four criteria. Every means of transparency should be designed to support carefully considered transparency objectives. And in considering various transparency options, it is necessary to understand what information should not be released to a given target audience to avoid damage to nonproliferation interests. It serves no purpose to release information if it does not result in increased confidence in the established transparent y goals.
Regarding cost, it should be realized that costs will be accrued both in terms of financial outlays and disruption of facility activities.
C. Delineate Applicable Transparency Options
In this section, PNC first identified the types of information that a variety of audiences might be interested in and not necessarily information that can be released (Table 2) . Secondly PNC looked at 'transparency options that could be used to release this information (Table 3) .
Promotional materials
Such as video tapes, brochures, tours and news releases could be used to explain both the nature of the facility and its complicated Processes.
Remote Monitoring A remote monitoring system, perhaps in a storage unit, could be used to confirm that appropriate measures are being taken to protect materials or that only declared activities are taking place in the monitored location.
I Environmental Monitoring
Confirming that shipments between facilities happen as declared and demonstrating that the shipments are adequately protected.
Independent Inspectors

I
Allowing inspections of a facility could decrease suspicions that something other than declared activities is taking place at the facility. 
A. Identify Conceptual Options for Transparency System Design
PNC mentioned that there are four steps in transparency system design. First, target facilities should be identified on the basis of proliferation concern. On this basis, reprocessing, enrichment, and MOX fuel fabrication facilities are of critical concern. Once a facility has been identified, the second step is to review the existing material accounting, monitoring, and tracking systems at the facility to determine whether information currently being gathered could also be useful for transparency. Third, the utility for transparency of this information must be assessed using the criteria of confidence building, protection, disruption, time, and cost. Finally, the transparency system would be built. This could be accomplished by accessing the current system, building a completely new system, or by using a combination of the current system and a new system. LANL took a facility by facility approach towards selecting transparency measures with their technical objectives for transparency shown in the 
B. Identify Instrumentation, Measurement, Data Collection and Data Display Options
It was discussed by both sides that using existing facility systems and measurement devices could be the most efficient use of resources. However, there may be several obstacles to this approach. For example, the facility systems might not collect all the information of interest or the sharing of information from these systems may be denied. An independent transparency system may be needed. Both sides concurred that sharing more existing information (reports, operations schedules, material measurements, etc.), posting information to a web site and remote monitoring are feasible data display options.
C. Technical Transparency Options
Zdentifv Technical Transuarencv Ov tions for Revrocessinp
Facilities. PNC mentioned an infrared camera system at a plutonium storage area in reprocessing facilities. An infrared camera can detect the heat emitting from the material stored inside a canister, and this type of picture could be used to confirm that the container is actually in use.
LANL mentioned that on-stack stable noble gas monitoring was a particular transparency method for reprocessing facilities. The basic idea of this method is to provide a confirmation measure of the bumup of the spent fuel undergoing reprocessing. This method would provide a means of distinguishing between reactor-grade and weapons-grade Pu and is based on conducting an isotopic analysis of the xenon content of air samples taken from the plant stack. LANL added that the principle of this method has been demonstrated in experiments in the US and relies on current technology.
Zdentifi Technical TransDarencv ODtions for Enrichment
Facilities. PNC noted that the most valuable information at an enrichment facility is the 235Ucontent to show that the facility does not make any HEU. The discussion on data processing and data display options given with regard to reprocessing facilities also applies here. As an example, PNC discussed the use of an enrichment pipe monitor to monitor enrichment of the material, with a time series display of the data.
LANL focused on the use of environmental sampling (ES) as part of transparent y. ES is concerned with the analysis of long-lived actinides in soil, water, vegetation, and other samples taken near nuclear
facilities. An example signature near an enrichment plant would be the atom percent 235Uin the sample.
LANL noted that ES is currently playing a large role in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Strengthened Safeguards.
Zdentifv Technical Transnarencv ODtions for MUX Fuel Fabrication Facilities. LANL
mentioned the possible applications of NTvision to transparent y in nonproliferation. NTvision is a LANL technology to use digital video monitoring to observe changes as they occur using Internet technologies.
It is an event-driven technology that can identify changes in an image with respect to a reference image.
Access to the data is given on a password basis using an Internet browser. He also discussed possible applications to remote monitoring and mentioned that the NTvision team is looking for qualified beta testers.
PNC described the Joyo Remote Monitoring System (JRMS), which is an example of a new system designed to work independently from facility systems with a goal of improving transparency.
IV. Conclusion
With PNC'S and LANL's independent studies and exchange of information and views in the workshops, this fundamental research on "Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation" was completed iv June 1998.
Both PNC and LANL are now working on a final paper and investigating the candidate subjects as a follow on to this transparent y study. A future subject will be focused on introducing actual technical transparency measures into facilities where transparency is desired.
Remarks 1:
The views presented in this paper represent only the personal views of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of PNC, LANL, DOE or the University of California. All discussions were from the nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint, so information considered for release for enhancing transparency does not always mean that operators can actually release it from safeguards and physical protection of nuclear material viewpoints. In case of actual information release, more consideration and discussion are definitely needed from many viewpoints.
